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NuVeda, LLC v. Eighth Jud. Dist. Ct., 137 Nev. Adv. Op. 54 (Sept. 23, 2021)1
Civil Practice: NRS 22.030(3) Objections Must be Reasonably Prompt and Timely
Summary:
NuVeda challenged the district court’s decision to deny the motion to transfer the contempt
hearing to another judge under NRS 22.030(3).2 NRS 22.030(3) is a peremptory challenge that
allows accused contemnors the right to request a new judge if they request it in a timely and prompt
manner. NuVeda requested a petition for writ of prohibition and mandamus. The Court found the
district court did not err when they denied NuVeda's motion. The court emphasized that a party
may waive its right to move for a new judge if they fail to make the request in a reasonably prompt
manner. Therefore, the Court denied the petition.
Facts and Procedural History:
The dispute arises from a complex business case where NuVeda allegedly violated the
court order constituting contempt. Appellant denies the alleged contempt, but the facts of the
business dispute are immaterial to the writ petition at bar.
On February 1, 2021, Judge Gonzalez found that NuVeda's alleged contempt warranted a
hearing. Accordingly, the judge scheduled the hearing for March 1. The Appellant’s managing
member could not attend the hearing, so on or around February 22, it was rescheduled to April 5.
On March 10, NuVeda raised NRS 22.030(3) for the first time, objecting to Judge Gonzalez from
presiding over the contempt hearing. The district court acknowledged that it might have granted
the request for a new judge to preside over the hearing, but NuVeda invoked the statute too late.
The district court found NuVeda waived its right when it failed to include it in its continuance
motion. Appellant denied that it ever moved for a continuance and renewed its objection under the
statute. The district court overruled its objection. This Court stayed the contempt hearing until it
resolved the writ petition.
Discussion:
This issue before the Court is whether the district court erred when it denied the motion to
transfer the contempt hearing to another judge under NRS 22.030(3),
The Court Will Entertain the Writ Petition
The Court retains discretion to determine writs of prohibition or mandamus due to their
extraordinary remedies because clarification is needed, and it is in the best interest of preserving
the judicial economy. 3 The Court reiterated that NRS 22.030(3) is a procedural rule that risks
implication in contempt hearings irrespective of the underlying substantive law. Thus, the Court
retains the right to consider the writ petition at bar.
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Standard of Review
The Court concluded that a writ of mandamus and prohibition are counterparts, which
require different standards of review.4 A writ of mandamus requires a showing of an abuse of
discretion.5 A writ of prohibition requires a court to review the facts de novo because the court is
responsible for ascertaining whether a district court exceeded its authority.6 Here, NuVeda seeks
both forms of relief, so the Court reviewed the jurisdictional facts de novo. However, the Court
emphasized that the burden remains on the petitioner to show the district court exceeded its
authority.7
A Motion for a new Judge under NRS 22.020(3) Must be Made Reasonably Promptly
NRS 22.020(3) serves as a peremptory challenge and when invoked, “automatic[ally]
recuse[s]” a judge from presiding over the contempt trial. 8 However, the Court emphasized that if
a party invokes the statute, they are still subject to doing so in a “timely and properly.” 9 The Court
previously ruled that invoking the statute after the contempt hearing did not meet the “timely”
standard.10
NuVeda asserts that the statute does not expressly provide a deadline for when a party must
object. Thus, they maintain that if the objection is raised any time before the contempt trial takes
place, then recusing the judge is automatic. However, the Court rejects NuVeda’s interpretation
and holds that objections can be waived if a party does not assert it reasonably and promptly. The
justification for this is because of the increased chance of wasting judicial time and resources or
the possibility of litigants using it for strategic purposes.11
The District Court did not Err
The Court concluded that the District Court did not err when they found that NuVeda’s
motion was untimely because it was raised 37 days (filed on March 10) after they were aware of
the contempt hearing (February 1). NuVeda asserts that the district court erred when they held
NuVeda waived its objection when it moved for a continuance (February 22). This Court held this
inquiry is immaterial to deciding if the objection was raised timely. Instead, the Court reiterated
NuVeda had the opportunity to request for a new judge any time after February 1 but did not do
so for 37 days. NuVeda presented no justification for its delay demonstrating the Court’s concern
of wasting judicial resources and time or misuse of the statute if raised too late. The Court held the
district court did not err since NuVeda lacked any justification for the 37-day delay.
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Conclusion:
The Court emphasized an accused of contemnors’ right to object from having the district
court judge presiding over the contempt trial under NRS 22.030(3). A district court cannot deny a
party this right if the party raises it timely and promptly. Here, the district court did not err when
it denied NuVeda’s request for a new judge for the contempt trial because NuVeda invoked the
statute 37 days after the court scheduled the hearing. NuVeda had ample time to move for a new
judge but did not. Nor did NuVeda provide a sufficient justification for its delay. Thus, this Court
denies the petition for a writ of relief.

